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Striving for equality has been oft en, if not always, at the heart of the ethos of demo-
cratic regimes, even when practices fall short of such ambitious goal. Th e trend 
towards an ever increasing equality still faces an important and pervasive limita-
tion, i.e. citizenship is not a right shared by all, but a privilege of birth, or descent, or 
autochthony. Th is problem was voiced in Plato’s dialogue Menexenus: is democracy 
viable if no historical ties or common culture justifi es solidarity and bearable shar-
ing democratic burdens? Is social equality of the citizens a condition forcing to seek 
legal equality or an enemy of excellence?
In spite of the enormous diff erences between Popper’s and Strauss’ agendas and 
even their ideals, both chose to explore the normative foundation of democracy 
by confrontation with Plato and his predecessors. Karl Popper in Th e Open society 
criticized Plato’s arguments against equality proposing an idiosyncratic interpreta-
tion of the controversy on Nature and Convention. Leo Strauss in his conferences on 
Natural right and history also elaborated on the emergence of the concepts of Physis 
and Nomos confronting Plato against “classical conventionalism”. Th is paper engages 
Popper and Strauss in a fi ctive debate on the foundations of political equality.
Keywords: Karl Popper, Leo Strauss, equality, convention, nature, Plato’s 
Menexemus.
Buscar arduamente a igualdade tem estado muitas vezes, senão sempre, no coração 
do ethos dos regimes democráticos, mesmo quando as práticas fi cam aquém dessa 
meta ambiciosa. A tendência para uma cada vez maior igualdade enfrenta todavia 
uma limitação importante e generalizada, ou seja, a cidadania não é um direito 
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partilhado por todos, mas um privilégio do nascimento, descendência ou ligação à 
terra. Platão deu voz a este problema num diálogo intitulado Menexeno: é a demo-
cracia viável se não há vínculos históricos ou uma cultura comum que justifi quem 
a solidariedade e tornem suportável a partilha dos fardos democráticos? É a igual-
dade social dos cidadãos uma condição que força a busca da igualdade legal ou um 
inimigo de excelência?
Apesar das enormes diferenças entre as agendas de Strauss e Popper e mesmo dos 
seus ideais, ambos optaram por explorar a base normativa da democracia por con-
fronto com Platão e seus predecessores. Karl Popper em A Sociedade aberta criticou 
os argumentos de Platão contra a igualdade propondo uma interpretação idios-
sincrática da controvérsia sobre Natureza e Convenção. Leo Strauss nas suas con-
ferências sobre Direito natural e história também discorreu sobre o aparecimento 
dos conceitos de Physis e Nomos, confrontando Platão com o “convencionalismo 
clássico”. Este artigo envolve Popper e Strauss num debate imaginário sobre os fun-
damentos da igualdade política.
Palavras-chave: Karl Popper, Leo Strauss, igualdade, convenção, natureza, 
Menexeno de Platão.
1. Introduction 
Striving for equality has oft en, if not always, been at the heart of the ethos of 
democratic regimes, even when practices fall short of such ambitious goals. 
Th e trend seems to move in the direction of expanding equality and abol-
ishing all barriers to its spreading: abolition of literacy or property require-
ments for political participation, female suff rage, lowering of voting age, 
proportional representation, etc.. Th is ever increasing equality still faces an 
important and pervasive limitation, i.e. citizenship is not a right shared by 
all, but a privilege of birth, or descent, or autochthony, as if some last trace 
of aristocracy persisted.
Th e use of descent as a title to citizenship is very ancient. Let us recall 
for a moment a short and almost forgotten dialogue by Plato, who comically 
describes Athenian democracy, saying that some call it democracy, but what-
ever name we use, it really is an aristocracy with the consent of the major-
ity (Plato, Menexenus, 238 b-d). At the center of the dialogue is a Funeral 
Oration, a prayer for the dead in battle presented to the young Menexenus 
by Socrates, composed of two parts: an encomium of the deceased and a 
consolation of their families. In the encomium Socrates engages in praising 
Athens, claiming the autochthony of its citizens. In Plato’s Eulogy, Socrates 
also explains the basis of Athens’ democratic system:
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Th e basis of our government is equality of birth; for other states are made 
up of all sorts and unequal conditions of men, and therefore their governments 
are unequal; there are tyrannies and there are oligarchies, in which the one 
party are slaves and the others masters. But we and our citizens are brethren, 
the children all of one mother, and we do not think it right to be one another’s 
masters or servants; but the natural equality of birth compels us to seek for 
legal equality, and to recognize no superiority except in the reputation of virtue 
and wisdom. (Menex. 238e and ff .)
Plato’s Menexenus is a complementary piece to the Gorgias (cfr. 
Schofi eld, 2006, Dodds, 1959), a caricature of democratic rhetoric, where 
any audience of «children» and children-like adults is convinced by a con-
fectioner to choose healthier foods. Th e narrative context of the dialogue 
leaves no doubt in the reader about the nature of the deeply ironic Funeral 
Oration (cfr. Méridier, 2003, Kahn 1963), but it is possible to talk about very 
serious matters in a comic way. 
2. Platonic Readings
Karl Popper was outraged by this dialogue, guilty of trying to demolish 
Pericles’ funeral oration, a democratic cornerstone laying the foundation of 
the symbolic world of Athenian democracy: the virulence of the Platonic 
attack on democracy reveals itself in the obvious parody contained in his 
dialogue (cfr. Popper, 2009: 211). 
In a footnote, he adds that if some hold the Menexenus to be spuri-
ous, this merely shows their tendency to idealize Plato (Ibidem). On the 
contrary: Menexenus, a searing reply to Pericles’ Funeral oration, is the dia-
logue that hints at Plato’s true intentions and reveals his own seduction by 
the ideal of an open society: 
In spite of his attempt to hide his feelings behind irony and scorn, he can-
not but show how deeply he was impressed by Pericles’ sentiments. Th is is how 
Plato makes his ‘Socrates’ maliciously describe the impression made upon him 
by Pericles’ oration: ‘A feeling of exultation stays with me for more than three 
days, not until the end of the fourth or fi ft h day, and not without an eff ort, do 
I come to my senses and realize where I am’. Who can doubt that Plato reveals 
here how seriously he was impressed by the creed of the open society, and how 
hard he had to struggle to come to his senses and to realize where he was – 
namely, in the camp of its enemies (Popper, 2009: 211, quoting Menex. 235b 
cfr. Idem: 355, note 61).
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Karl Popper argues that it is urgent to bury Plato, because great men 
make great mistakes. Th is is necessary to maintain progress towards an «open 
society». His modern interpretation of Plato is still among the most famous, 
although classical scholars tend to consider it marginal, if not anachronistic 
(cfr. Bambrough, 1962 and Idem, 1967; Field, 1944; sed Ryle, 1948). 
I will not argue here for the impartiality of Karl Popper’s contribution 
to the «war eff ort», since that contribution has the form of a political mani-
festo against the enemies of the open society, more harsh and emotional in 
tone than Popper desired (Popper, 2009: xi). Besides, he states, again and 
again, that he never intended to be neutral against Plato and his totalitarian 
model of a «well organized state», and that it was only an interpretation, 
although a serious one, which he would like to see refuted (cfr. Idem: 372). 
But it is important to clarify the implicit assumptions of this interpre-
tation, before proceeding to its content. Th ese are of two diff erent kinds: 
some are hermeneutic assumptions about the interpretation of Plato’s dia-
logues, while others consist of political (and epistemological) theses that 
Popper wants to present a contrario at Plato’s expenses. 
Some of the latter are already well known and justify the status of 
bestseller (and «longseller») that obviously does not apply to most of the 
academic literature on Plato: the defense of piecemeal social engineering, 
the protective state, equality before the law and humanitarianism – even 
his theory of democratic leadership, based on Th ucydides’ formula, is no 
longer unnoticed (cfr. Idem: 199). 
His interpretation of Plato, however, is no less famous and infl uential, 
although not all of it equally original (cfr. e.g. Gomperz, 1902; Crossman, 
1937). But in order to evaluate the assumptions in his interpretations of 
Plato’s dialogues, the target of a hot debate, a critical reader should engage 
in the lengthy reading of the notes – as a whole, a longer text than the main 
body of the book. Besides, Popper’s reading intertwines Plato’s doctrines 
and a review of his own ideas around pairs of concepts: individualism ver-
sus «holism», nominalism versus conceptual «realism», protective versus 
totalitarian state, democratic sovereignty versus theory of checks and bal-
ances, institutionalism versus personalism, etc..
Even so, I think it fair to enumerate the main theses on interpretative 
issues as follows: 1) In the dialogues Socrates is Plato’s mouthpiece, but the 
two are almost opposite, until Plato’s fi nal betrayal of his master, proposing 
laws that would lead to a new condemnation of Socrates; 2) Plato is a «dog-
matic» and not skeptical philosopher; 3) he deliberately «distorts» the most 
fundamental concepts such as justice, equality or democracy as compared 
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to how they are commonly used by his contemporaries; 4) his work is 
essentially an intervention program; 5) his theories defended class interests, 
the interests of a class to which he belonged by family; 6) the Republic and 
the Laws (in particular) present a blueprint for a totalitarian society, whose 
corollaries are a caste system, an educational and eugenic program for the 
guardians and the expulsion of poets;  7) It is Plato’s contempt for the truth 
that leads him to resort to pious myths and lies as an ideological cover.
It is characteristic of Aristotle that he presented the debate between 
egalitarianism and the oligarchic conception of justice as a conversation 
between two factions or parties, both of them with an incomplete vision of 
justice. He situated himself above these incomplete opinions like an umpire. 
It is, in fact, sometimes benefi cial to resort to a contrasting view in 
order to clarify the issues in question. Although it is not always easy to fi nd 
a deserving opponent who shares the same approach, in this case we can 
fi nd such an opponent in Leo Strauss. His work could be described as a 
kind of «platonic political philosophy». 
Strauss, however, barely mentions the Menexenus once, and only briefl y, 
recalling that the fi rst attempt to systematize political experience was made 
by the rhetoricians, but that their vision was obviously limited (cfr. Strauss, 
1971: 34). Th is dialogue was, in his view, a proof or a playful demonstra-
tion of the transferability of political knowledge, for Socrates borrowed his 
speech from Aspasia, who was ironically assumed to be the real author of 
Pericles’ speeches. 
Th e problem of «autochthony», the main motive of pride for Athenians in 
Menexemus’ encomium, is notwithstanding mentioned in the context of the 
problem of natural right and this goes to the heart of Leo Strauss’ concerns. 
Every ideology, he comments, is an attempt at justifi cation, against one-
self or against others, in the face of certain lines of conduct the righteousness 
of which is not evident (as Hindus use karma to justify the caste system). For 
example, the Athenians proclaim that they are native born and borne of the 
earth, and so their city is not founded on crime. Th is is a proof of the existence 
of a sort of intuition of natural right: thanks to reason, man has available a 
wide range of alternatives, but he is aware that the full and unrestricted exer-
cise of freedom is not just. Freedom is accompanied by a natural feeling that 
not everything is allowed, not unlike the «natural conscience» that Cicero 
mentions. Until cultivated, natural conscience feeds absurd taboos, but what 
guides the savage or the tribe is an inkling of what is right (Idem: 130).
Strauss’ interpretation of the Platonic texts could not, at fi rst glance, be 
more contrary to Popper’s. In Strauss view, Plato is fundamentally true to 
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the Socratic program, but Socrates cannot be considered Plato’s spokesman, 
because the dialogues are really like dramas and any playwright speaks both 
through the voice of his various characters and through their actions in the 
drama. In any case, Socrates was famous for his playful irony, and is there-
fore a problematic mouthpiece, since he oft en says diff erent things to diff er-
ent interlocutors (cfr. Zuckert, 2011). Plato does not distort, but certainly 
questions the meaning of words like justice, truth or excellence, as a peda-
gogical device, even if opinion and not truth is the essence of politics. Any 
government needs salutary myths because what is by nature just is likely, 
without dilution, to shake the foundations of society. Plato, in any case, is 
not a systematic philosopher, nor are the dialogues entries in an encyclo-
pedia of philosophical sciences and the Republic doesn’t present concrete 
politic proposals – «the Laws is the only political work proper of Plato» 
(Strauss & Cropsey, 1963: 231). He certainly did not want to abolish poetry, 
but argued that all poetry serves philosophy.
Interestingly, Strauss’ «architectonic» ideas are also known through pairs 
of concepts in a never resolved tension: Ancients versus Moderns, Athens 
versus Jerusalem, Philosophy versus Poetry, Reason versus Revelation (or 
Law), facts and values, etc.. But his political ideas and his art of writing lead 
to a very diff erent evaluation of Plato political thought.
In short, Popper regarded the Republic as a totalitarian utopia; Leo 
Strauss thought it was the best cure against totalitarian ambition in politics. 
Indeed, both Leo Strauss and Karl Popper discussed or criticized Plato’s 
ideas as if he was a contemporary, without too much concern for his «being 
a man of his time». He is very much alive in their analyses. 
Th eir interpretations continue to surprise us and to be read, however, 
not for the merits of the interpretation itself – for all its charm – but because 
they are important in current political debate. At fi rst sight, they only share 
their admiration for Socrates and the Socratic ideal, which they both kept to 
the end of their own lives, and an essentially political reading of Plato. Th e 
two interpretations cannot, of course, both be true to Plato political thought. 
But if, in general, the accusatory tone, a bit crude, in Popper’s text outraged 
Platonists, even if they sometimes recognized its suggestive or provocative 
power, Strauss’ teachings on Plato also annoyed and made academics suspi-
cious (e.g. Pangle 2006, Drury, 1988, sed contra Minowitz 2009). 
We should not, however, ignore either of them altogether, for they 
are both extraordinary thinkers, even if idiosyncratic. It is not diffi  cult to 
engage them in a fi ctitious conversation on the subject of the philosophical 
foundation of political equality. 
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3. Nature and convention
In Karl Popper’s text dedicated to Plato’s «descriptive sociology», in his Open 
Society, he makes a careful presentation of the ancient Greek debate between 
«nature and convention». Such a debate precedes Plato: the approaching of 
social phenomena with a scientifi c spirit is not new to Plato (cfr. Popper, 
2009: 58) and the previous generation of Sophists distinguished two ele-
ments in the human environment, a natural one and a social one – a dif-
fi cult distinction since we tend to take our own environment for granted. 
However, distinguishing phisis and nomos, they broke with the tribal and 
magical attitude, characteristic of closed societies living in a charmed circle 
of laws, taboos and immutable customs (Cfr. Ibidem).
Karl Popper however further clarifi es this distinction by asserting the 
enormous diff erence between natural laws, such as those that describe the 
motion of the planets, and normative laws that prescribe or forbid, whether 
the Ten Commandments, a set of parliamentary election rules or – the rele-
vant case – the laws in the Athenian constitution. Th e former are invariable 
regularities that do not allow changes or exceptions, but only falsehood, 
and are out of human control, even if they can be used for technological 
purposes. Th e latter are enforced by man and may change, but it cannot be 
said of them – except metaphorically – that they are true or false, only good 
or bad, right or wrong.
Certainly, some think there are «natural» standards, because they are in 
accordance with human nature, or psychological laws of human behavior. 
But the two kinds of laws have little more in common than the name and 
a debate presupposes the clarifi cation of the diff erence, in order to avoid 
misunderstandings due to poor terminology (Idem: 60).
To understand Plato’s sociology, Popper considers it necessary to 
explain how this distinction between natural and normative laws was 
developed. Th e starting point is what he designates as «naive monism» 
typical of closed societies, where the distinction was ignored, and this 
could appear in two ways: «naïve naturalism», a belief that social regu-
larities seemed impossible to change, and «naïve conventionalism», the 
assumption that everything that goes on in nature seems to result from the 
arbitrary decisions of men and gods, and can be changed in a magical way 
(Idem: 61, cfr. 254 n.3).
Th e historical fact that breaks magic tribalism is the clash of cultures, 
the fi nding that there are diff erent taboos in diff erent tribes and that these 
can be disobeyed without unpleasant consequences, because laws are made 
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by man, either the Solon code or the democratic laws of the city. Th is gives 
rise to what he calls a «critical dualism» of facts and values, or a «critical 
conventionalism», which is announced in terms of the opposition between 
nature and convention. Th is is the position taken by an older contemporary 
of Socrates, Protagoras. 
Such a dualism, according to Popper, does not necessarily imply a the-
ory of the origin of the laws, i.e. that these were introduced consciously 
rather than discovered, or came from God or man (Idem: 62). But neither 
minimizes the importance of standards and even less implies that laws are 
merely arbitrary because they are the works of men. 
Th e theory implies only that laws may be amended by a decision or 
convention and that only man is morally responsible for their formulation 
or acceptance, or for improving them, following patterns that are not found 
in nature, since nature is neither moral nor immoral. Men are products of 
nature, but nature gave men the power to predict, plan or change the world.
Th ese decisions or values are not derived from facts. We are not 
opposed to slavery because no man is born with chains: some may want 
to put other men in chains, and others freed them. We can change or resist 
change, or not act at all, but no decision can ever be derived from facts (cfr. 
Idem: 63). Such is the doctrine of the «autonomy of ethics, fi rst advocated 
by Protagoras and Socrates» (Idem: 68). 
Leo Strauss also dedicated a long chapter in his Natural Right and 
History to the emergence of the idea of phisis that disturbs the identifi cation 
of the ancestral and the good, and leads to philosophy (Strauss, 1971: 90 
and ff .). But, of course, the only sense of the expression «natural right» or 
«natural law» in which he was interested was the possibility of the existence 
of «natural» standards for human action, or the foundation of ethics and 
politics in accordance with human nature. Let us call these standards psy-
chological laws of human behavior, using Popper’s expression, and avoid 
verbal disputes (cfr. Popper, 2009: 63-68). 
For Strauss, however, the mere diversity of opinions about justice or 
right is not an argument against the existence of such standards. Th e exist-
ence of diff erent taboos in diff erent tribes is not only compatible with, but 
a precondition for the discovery of natural right. Th e diversity of concep-
tions of justice would only be incompatible with natural right if unanimous 
consent was required and not merely potential consent (Strauss, 1971: 125). 
As Plato asserted, even the most primitive and bizarre view points beyond 
itself, because people’s opinions come into confl ict and a philosopher guides 
them above opinions, in the direction of truth. Of course, no assurance can 
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be given that a philosopher can do more than identify fundamental alterna-
tives or that philosophy goes beyond the stage of debate (Ibidem).
Strauss does not disagree with Popper that classical conventionalism 
does not imply that laws are merely arbitrary because they are the works of 
men, but they did not formulate a coherent political theory. A convention-
alist, as appears to be the case of Protagoras or Antiphon, disregards the 
truth embodied in opinion and appeals to nature and this is why Socrates 
was forced to demonstrate what is naturally just in terms of conventional-
ism, appealing to facts as opposed to speeches – the Republic is such an 
appeal put in a document.
Th e basic premise of conventionalism was the identifi cation of good 
with pleasure, and so the proponents of classical natural right are critics 
of hedonism. What is good for them is more fundamental than pleasure: 
diff erent needs explain the diff erences between pleasures, but needs are not 
a bundle of desires, because there is a natural order of needs, which are dif-
ferent according to each being. What is good refers to the natural constitu-
tion or quid, which determines the hierarchy of a being’s goods (Strauss, 
1971: 127). Each specifi c constitution corresponds to a specifi c operation: if 
something is good, it does the work that corresponds to its nature. To know 
what is good for man, we need to know man’s natural constitution. All ani-
mals have a soul and the human soul is distinguished by speech or reason 
(logos), and so what is good for man is to live thoughtfully. Life is good if it 
is the perfection of human nature (Ibidem). 
A life of excellence can be defended in hedonistic terms rather than 
per se, but this view distorts phenomena as understood by impartial and 
competent, i.e. not morally obtuse, men (Idem: 128). Everyone admires a 
harmonious soul, regardless of the benefi ts. Th e utilitarian or hedonistic 
logic can only be explained with an ad hoc hypothesis (good is a refi ned cal-
culation of pleasures, etc.). Ancient hedonism is, however, mainly a private 
stance, without political doctrine.
Karl Popper questions any laws of «human nature», which he reduces 
to mere sociological and psychological regularities of human behavior. He 
considers them connected to the functioning of social institutions (Popper, 
2009: 69). Plato formulated a theory of «psychological or spiritual natural-
ism» combining elements of Antiphon’s or Pindar’s biological naturalism 
with elements of ethical positivism (Idem: 70, cfr. 70-75). Plato’s vague spir-
itual naturalism surprisingly, however, according to Popper, had no great 
consequences – as opposed to the priority of the state over the imperfection 
of individual men.
diacrítica 27.indb   95 18-12-2013   12:45:35
96 JOSÉ COLEN
Plato does not always use the word «nature» in the same sense, but the 
most important sense is virtually identical to «essence», the meaning that 
prevails when we speak of the nature of mathematics, or happiness, or mis-
ery (Idem: 75-76). When used by Plato, nature is the same as Form or idea, 
which is not in a thing but separated from it (Idem 76, cfr. 15-32). 
Natural is what is innate or original, or divine, while artifi cial things are 
copies of ideas, two or three degrees away, even more removed from reality 
than tangible things in fl ux (Popper, 2009: 76). Plato agrees with Antiphon 
on one point: he assumes that the opposition between nature and conven-
tion corresponds to the opposition between truth and falsehood, reality 
and appearance, original and man-made, objects of reason and opinions. 
As science should know the true nature of things, the most important 
task of social science is to examine the nature of human society or the state. 
But nature is the origin of something, according to the historicist meth-
ods he fi nds in Plato (something that Strauss would never grant). What is 
the nature of society? According to Popper, the answer lies in the Republic 
and the Laws where he presents his spiritual naturalism:  the polis is a con-
vention or a social contract, but not only that; it is a natural convention, a 
convention based on human nature, the social nature of man, which has its 
origin in the imperfection of the human individual (Idem:77).
In opposition to Socrates, according to Popper, Plato teaches that what 
is human cannot be not self-suffi  cient. Plato insists that there are many 
degrees of human perfection, but even the «rare and uncommon natures» 
that approach perfection depend on others, even if only for manual work, 
and therefore man can only reach perfection in society: the best society 
should be his «social habitat» (Idem: 78).
Th e state is above people because only the state is self-suffi  cient or 
autarkic. Th e individual and society are interdependent: one owes his exist-
ence to the other, but the superiority of the latter manifests itself in many 
ways, including the idea that the state of decadence and disunity is caused 
by the imperfection of the soul, of human nature.
Leo Strauss is very attentive to the nature of the change of thought car-
ried out by Socrates – i. e., Plato’s Socrates, the only Socrates we know that 
does not fi t on the back of a stamp. At fi rst glance, Socrates turned away 
from the study of nature and limited his inquiries to human things and so 
refused to look at human things in the light of the subversive distinction 
between nature and convention. 
In his view, however, this conclusion mistakes Socrates’ starting point 
or the result of his investigations for the «substance of his thought» (Strauss, 
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1971: 121). Strauss agrees that the classics presuppose the validity of the 
distinction between convention and nature when demanding that law 
should follow the order established by nature. Th e characteristic institu-
tions of Plato’s best polity, e.g., are «in accordance with nature», and against 
habits or customs (Ibidem).
When in Plato’s dialogues Socrates raises the question «What is X?» 
(courage, city, etc.), he is forced to also raise the question of the ratio rerum 
humanorum and to approach the study of human things as such, as irreduc-
ible to divine or natural things. «What, its ‘shape’ or ‘form’ or character (…) 
cannot be understood as a product of the process leading to it» (Idem: 123). 
On the contrary, the process can only be understood through its telos. Leo 
Strauss recalled that this transformation was a return to sobriety from the 
madness of his predecessors. As he liked to repeat, Socrates did not separate 
wisdom and moderation. In modern language this means a return to com-
mon sense. Disregarding opinions about the nature of things and especially 
of human things amounted to abandoning the most important source of 
access to reality. His starting point was the surface or eidos or shape vis-
ible, fi rst to us, not fi rst by itself. Th is ascent from opinions was the friendly 
art of conversation, dialectic. Such dialogues are made possible by the fact 
that opinions about what things are, e.g. justice, are diff erent and contrary 
(Idem: 124).
4. Natural and conventional sociability and equality
According to Popper, whether it was Protagoras or Lycophron who pro-
posed the theory that laws have their origin in a social contract, Plato com-
bines Protagoras’ conventionalism with his naturalism – an indication that 
even the original version of conventionalism did not maintain that laws 
were completely arbitrary, as confi rmed by Plato’s comments (cfr. Idem: 79, 
n. 27 and Th eetetus, 172b). In the Laws, Plato lists the principles on which 
political authority can rely, mentioning the biological naturalism of the 
Th eban poet Pindar («the strong rule the weak»), but proposing a correc-
tion: the wise rule and the rulers follow, an amendment which would not be 
contrary to nature, because based on mutual consent.
In the Republic Popper also found elements of naturalism combined 
with a contractualist (and utilitarian) theory. Th e inhabitants gather 
together to promote their interests, although behind this there is always the 
idea that man is not self-suffi  cient (Popper, 2009: 79).
diacrítica 27.indb   97 18-12-2013   12:45:35
98 JOSÉ COLEN
Strauss, on the contrary, stresses that for all classics (including Plato) 
man is by nature a social animal. He is constituted in such a way that he 
cannot live well without other men, because it is logos, discourse, that 
distinguishes him from other animals and this supposes communication 
(Strauss 1971: 129). Man is so radically more social than other animals that 
sociability is humanity itself, i.e., all actions – social and anti-social – refer 
to others, not from a calculation of the pleasures to be derived from associa-
tion, but because the mere association gives him pleasure: 
His sociality does not proceed, then, from a calculation of the pleasures 
which he expects from association, but he derives pleasure from association 
because he is by nature social. Love, aff ection, friendship, pity, are as natural to 
him as concern with his own good and calculation of what is conducive to his 
own good. It is man’s natural sociality that is the basis of natural right in the 
narrow or strict sense of right. Because man is by nature social, the perfection 
of his nature includes the social virtue par excellence: justice; justice and right 
are natural. All members of the same species are akin to one another. Th is nat-
ural kinship is deepened and transfi gured in the case of man as a consequence 
of his radical sociality (Strauss 1971: 129).
All members of the same species are related, but in man this relation-
ship is deepened by his radical sociability. Procreation is only partly a way 
to preserve the species; there is no relation between men that is totally 
free and everyone is aware of it (Ibidem). Men diff er from brutes through 
speech or reason (logos), so the good life is the examined life. Man is by 
nature social and cannot live well except when living with others; he refers 
to others in every human act. Love, aff ection, friendship and pity are as 
natural for him as his own self-interest. Men are free but have a sense that 
the unrestrained exercise of that freedom is not right and if men have not 
cultivated their conscience properly, they will produce absurd taboos.
Man cannot reach perfection except in civil society, or in the city. Th e full 
achievement of humanity is not, however some sort of passive membership. 
Th e good man is identical with the citizen who exercises the activity of a ruler: 
power will reveal a man and give him opportunities to excel (Idem: 133). 
Since Plato and the classics viewed moral and political matters in the 
light of man’s perfection they certainly were not egalitarians, and equal 
rights appeared unjust to them (Idem: 134, 135). But Plato’s so called «natu-
ralism», according to Strauss, was full of potential consequences. In fact, the 
latter were so extreme that they had to be diluted as to allow political life:
diacrítica 27.indb   98 18-12-2013   12:45:35
99PHYSIS AND NOMOS
Th e justice of the city [according to nature] may be said to consist in acting 
according to the principle «from everyone according to his capacity and to eve-
ryone according to his merits» (….) Since there is no good reason for assum-
ing that the capacity for meritorious action is bound up with sex, beauty, and 
so on, «discrimination» on account of sex, ugliness, and so on is unjust. Th e 
only proper reward for service is honor, and therefore the only proper reward 
for outstanding service is great authority. In a just society the social hierarchy 
will correspond strictly to the hierarchy of merit and of merit alone. Now, as a 
rule, civil society regards as an indispensable condition for holding high offi  ce 
that the individual concerned be a born citizen, a son of a citizen father and a 
citizen mother. Th at is to say, civil society in one way or another qualifi es the 
principle of merit, i.e., the principle par excellence of justice, by the wholly 
unconnected principle of indigenousness. (Idem: 148) 
Karl Popper preferred to call attention to the tradition of egalitarian 
thinkers, which Plato opposed. Even if equality and democracy are simply 
human standards or institutions «men made», democracy was cherished, as 
Popper pointed out, although oft en called isonomia or equality – Strauss does 
not deny that there is an egalitarian natural right (cfr. Idem: 118), but we 
barely know what it stands for and for good reason: it is by nature apolitical. 
It should be noted that the fundamental natural or biological equality 
between men, referred to in modern Declarations of the Rights of Man and 
of the Citizen plays no role in Popper’s own theory, which considers it only 
to be «language of great eff ect», not a relevant argument. Not only because, 
although humans are alike in many respects, they diff er in many others, 
but also because the normative rules cannot be inferred from any fact. No 
pattern or value follows from a fact. Only very primitive societies, where 
«uncritical conventionalism» pervades, confuse nomos and phisis. Th eories 
of «natural rights» oft en arise in support of humanitarian and egalitarian 
ideas, but this is more an accident than a necessity.
For Plato no two people are alike, each has his particular nature, some 
are made for certain work, others for others, and the defense of the eco-
nomic principle of the division of labor is based on an element of biological 
naturalism, the uneven nature of man, fi rst introduced innocently and then 
with far-reaching consequences because, in fact, the only important divi-
sion of labor is the division between rulers and ruled, based on the natural 
inequality between masters and servants, wise and ignorant.
Plato’s position is generally a vague spiritual naturalism best formulated 
in the Laws. Th e arguments in Plato’s spiritual naturalism, according to 
Popper, are unable to answer any specifi c question of whether some law is 
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fair in particular: they are too vague to be applied to any problem and only 
provide generic arguments in favor of conservatism. In practice everything 
is left  to the wisdom of the great lawgiver (according to him, recognizable in 
the Laws as a self-portrait of Plato). In contrast, the interdependence theory 
and anti-egalitarianism have substantial consequences.
5. Equality and universal citizenship?
In brief, according to Karl Popper, Plato oppos es equality based on an 
inconsequent biological naturalism and errs because patterns are found 
not in nature but in men standards (and hearts?); according to Leo Strauss, 
Plato opposes equality because what is by nature just must be qualifi ed in 
order to preserve society.
Although it is, of course, somewhat of a paradox that Plato, the only 
great ancient philosopher to voice the possibility of radical equality, equal-
ity of property, of men and women, and of citizens in the polity equal at 
birth, seemed to be, at the same time, the least inclined to its actualization. 
Some say, however, it was not him but Aristotle that utterly discred-
ited nature as a standard for society. Aristotle inferred from his view of 
nature that equality proper was desirable only in the best polity, where the 
good man and the good citizen are the same. Extreme democracy, that is, 
a democracy where even the mechanics are citizens is not in accordance 
with nature. Citizenship is a «privilege», not a right. It ensures freedom for 
free men, but not for men as men and therefore coexists peacefully with not 
only slavery but also with the near absence of rights for foreigners, totally 
unacceptable ideas to us. 
On the contrary, Plato’s dialogue still challenges us today because it 
raises in a magnifi cent form the problem of the foundation of political 
equality. Some, if not all, of the problems voiced in the dialogue – whether 
we feel outraged or merely challenged – still deserve careful consideration: 
is democracy viable if no historical ties or common culture justify a certain 
solidarity (as brothers and not masters and slaves) and make sharing demo-
cratic burdens bearable? Is the social equality of citizens a condition forcing 
the seeking of legal equality (and even the defense of freedom abroad) or an 
enemy of excellence? 
Th at is because we fi nd ourselves in a paradoxical situation: it seems 
appropriate to expand equality and uphold universal citizenship, but we lack 
the arguments at Plato’s disposal. It is characteristic of us that we run extensive 
empirical studies on inequality, but we do not know how to justify political 
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equality, since the traditional foundations – God and nature – do not appear 
solid foundations to us anymore, and rest on the mere whim or fancy of men.
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